I move: That Dáil Éireann: notes that: — thousands of homeowners affected by defective concrete have spent years living with uncertainty regarding the safety of their homes, the adequacy of available remediation options and the long-term security of their families; — many affected families have experienced repeated changes in engineering advice, evolving scientific understanding and revisions to the redress scheme throughout that period; — for homeowners undertaking remediation works, decisions regarding whether existing foundations should be retained or replaced are among the most significant and irreversible choices they will make; — the Defective Concrete Blocks Grant Scheme permits the retention of existing foundations in affected dwellings in accordance with the updated National Standards Authority of Ireland I.S. (Irish Standard) 465:2026; — research underpinning I.S. 465:2026 has identified pyrrhotite and other sulphide minerals in the concrete foundations of affected homes, with evidence of oxidation and early-stage internal sulphate attack in some cases; — the scientific basis underpinning I.S. 465:2026 remains limited in duration, scale and longitudinal evidence, and does not conclusively establish long-term foundation performance; — as a result, I.S. 465:2026 operates in circumstances of acknowledged material scientific uncertainty regarding long-term structural durability; and — affected homeowners are being required to make decisions about retaining or remediating foundations in conditions of that uncertainty, with significant financial, legal and psychological consequences; recognises that: — the State is relying on I.S. 465:2026 as the governing technical standard for remediation decisions, despite acknowledged scientific uncertainty in its underpinning evidence; — where the State adopts a Standard in conditions of uncertainty, it must bear responsibility for managing resulting long-term structural risk and not transfer it to individual homeowners; — homeowners should not be exposed to future liability or repeated remediation costs arising from limitations in the scientific evidence base underpinning the Standard; and — in circumstances where failure mechanisms may be latent, progressive and not fully observable within assessment timeframes, policy must err decisively on the side of homeowner protection; and calls on the Government to: — commission an independent international review of the scientific basis of I.S. 465:2026, with specific focus on sulphide-related deterioration mechanisms in foundation concrete and their long-term behaviour; — publish in full the evidential basis, assumptions and uncertainty ranges used to justify foundation retention under I.S. 465:2026; — amend the operation of the Defective Concrete Blocks Grant Scheme to ensure that no homeowner is required to retain foundations where there is material engineering uncertainty regarding long-term durability; — provide an explicit entitlement for homeowners to opt for full foundation replacement where reasonable doubt exists as to future performance; — ensure that responsibility for residual long-term structural risk arising from application of I.S. 465:2026 remains with the State and not individual homeowners; and — report to Dáil Éireann within six months on the implementation of these measures and on any revision required to I.S. 465:2026 in light of emerging scientific evidence. I thank all those who worked on this motion, particularly my staff and 100% Redress party councillors who work every day on the ground dealing with owners of homes with defective concrete. I thank Dr. Chris Brough and Professor Paul Dunlop for their extremely important research on this topic. I also thank all the Opposition TDs and their parties for supporting this motion. The motion is about the State making decisions about people's homes in circumstances where its own technical standard accepts the science is not fully developed in certain foundation cases. These decisions determine remediation, housing security and the level of uncertainty families are left carrying for decades. At the centre of this is a simple question. When the science is not complete and the State must still act, who carries what remains unresolved? Is it the State or the homeowner? I should inform the House that I am directly affected by this matter and I deal with it every day. I am living with a defective concrete crisis. I am not relying on this at this stage of the argument but I mention it because it requires me to examine engineering reports and technical matters in great detail. What these reports make clear is not a disagreement about whether the risk exists. It is how the uncertainty is defined in the system and how it is carried into decisions that affect homes, finance and long-term security. The real issue is how known limits in technical knowledge become policy decisions. The governing standard says that the state of knowledge relating to foundations is insufficient to provide guidance for certain combinations of aggregate and active internal sulfate attack, ISA, risk factors. This is the precise limitation written into the standard. It acknowledges there are defined foundation conditions where scientific knowledge is insufficient for decision-making. The standard continues that undertaking sampling, testing and analysis of foundation concrete is expected to strengthen the knowledge base and inform future editions of the document. Therefore, the framework is not final. It is expected to evolve as more evidence becomes available. Since tabling this motion, I hosted a scientific briefing in Leinster House attended by researchers directly involved in investigating defective concrete deterioration mechanisms across Ireland. The purpose of the briefing was not to challenge the science. It was to listen to the science, which was presented. It reinforced a point already acknowledged in IS 465, that is, that understanding continues to evolve as more testing is undertaken and long-term evidence becomes available. The research highlighted that the scale of the affected properties will continue to expand significantly as testing progresses and deterioration becomes visible on properties that may not yet exhibit symptoms. This is precisely why this motion matters. When an evidence base is still developing, public policy must be designed to accommodate the reality, rather than assume all future outcomes are already known. It also states the purpose of foundation concrete testing is to identify, first, aggregate types, second, deleterious materials, and, third, potential future deterioration. Testing identifies risk factors but it does not resolve how these factors behave over time in every case. Importantly, foundation testing does not provide a full evaluation of a foundation's current conditions, which would necessitate more extensive sampling for inspection. Even after testing, there are recognised limits to what is known about the structure. This is a technical engineering standard and is not designed for conveyancing or property transactions but, in practice, it is now influencing mortgage assessments, insurance decisions and property values in affected areas. This is not theatrical. This is already reflected when homes are valued, financed and traded. In places like Donegal, defects and uncertainty are already visible in the housing market. The House should reflect carefully what was presented at the scientific briefing. The research did not present an estimate for all homes in Donegal. Analysis indicated a minimum of 12,000 homes in Donegal alone may ultimately fall within the high-risk category. That does not include social homes, of which there are 2,400, or community buildings, of which there are hundreds. It does not include commercial premises or mixed-use buildings. The distinction is extremely important. When we hear a figure of 12,000 homes, we are not looking at the full housing picture. It is a baseline. We are looking at only one segment of it. For years the State has pointed at figures of approximately 10,000 affected homes nationally, yet we have scientific analysis to suggest Donegal alone will exceed that figure. If that analysis is proven correct, the scale of this crisis has been profoundly underestimated. We must ask ourselves whether future risk has also been underestimated. The position is clear. The science is incomplete in defined areas. The standard acknowledges this directly. Decisions are still required within a framework. When that happens, uncertainty does not disappear. It is carried forward by the system and, in practice, the homeowners. The classification approach in the standard reinforces this structure. It states that foundation concrete should be classified in accordance with samples of foundation concrete from the highest risk classification. That would be the core sample taken with the most damage. Where multiple indicators exist, the highest classification must apply. Risk is not averaged. In determining the strongest identifying factor, where uncertainty is not fully resolved, it is not eliminated at the point of decision. It is deferred. This is the issue. Deferred uncertainty returns later as further remediation works, higher public costs and increased complexity as scientific understanding develops over time. What is not resolved does not disappear; it re-emerges later on. It will be more costly. This motion is not a criticism of the scientists, engineers or researchers who have worked on and informed IS 465 - quite the opposite. Good science identifies not only what is known but also what is not yet known. The research has been transparent about the limits of current evidence. We need ongoing testing and expectations that understanding will continue to develop. The question before the House is, therefore, whether we trust a science. The question is whether policy is responding appropriately to what the science is telling us. We have remaining uncertainty. This policy question is not a scientific one. This motion does not challenge the standard. It accepts what it states. It asks straightforward questions of policy coherence. Where the State accepts scientific knowledge is not yet complete in certain foundation conditions, should the consequences and uncertainty be carried by the homeowner by default? If the answer is "Yes", then this is a clear policy choice. If the answer is "No", the system must adjust to reflect the reality of what is going on. This matters because the decision before us is not simply about foundations; it is about the consequences of being wrong. The State has got this badly wrong once already. We are 14 years into this. Poor quality materials entered homes across affected counties and families are still paying the price today. We are being asked to make long-term foundation decisions in circumstances where the Government standard acknowledges limitations in current knowledge, where the evidence base continues to evolve and where there is uncertainty regarding long-term performance of retained foundations. If the scale of defective properties is significantly greater than previously understood, then potential consequences will be enormous. Saving money today by retaining foundations where reasonable doubt remains may reduce immediate expenditure but if those assumptions are proved incorrect in the years ahead, the cost will dwarf any short-term saving. The cost will not be simply financial; it will be measured in homes requiring further remediation, families forced to go through a process for a second time and properties that become difficult to finance, insure and sell. In a housing system already struggling to meet demand, the State's first failure contributed to this crisis. It would be unforgivable if, in attempting to resolve it, we were to spend public money in a manner that risked creating an even greater housing crisis. When uncertainty remains, caution is not an expensive option. Caution is a reasonable option. It is important to be clear what this means in practice. These are not abstract issues. They affect a home and whether a home can be sold, remortgaged or insured. They affect whether families can rely on their homes as stable, long-term assets. They affect financial security and the housing market in Donegal and all affected counties.

Sentiment score: -0.05

I thank my colleagues who stood with me today and those who took the time to go beyond the briefing material and the political framing and had the empathy to understand what families are living through on the ground. Before we vote, I want to speak plainly, not in a language of schemes, standards or reassurance, but in a language that explains what is happening to people on the ground. I have sat in homes where families are in this crisis, and I have heard things that have never appeared in reports. People are lying awake at night wondering if their home is safe. Parents are trying to hide this fear from their children. Families are trying to hold ordinary life together while carrying on in an uncertainty that they did not create. This is the reality. There is no data and there are no summaries and no briefing. It is reality. No homeowner or child caused this crisis, yet they are the ones that are carrying it. We are told the scheme is improving. We are told progress is being made, but uncertainty is still in people's homes. It is still at the kitchen table, and it is still in their lives. I ask the House one question. Who is carrying the uncertainty? It is not being carried in here. It has been carried elsewhere by the families, by the children. People who stood should never have been asked to carry this burden at all. Never should this have happened. I recognise that many Members will vote under party instruction, but this Chamber has also seen Members break that. I ask that safety and security, and the future of children and their families, be on Deputies' conscience when they are voting. They have to go back to their constituents when it is in their area, and tell them why they did not vote to help. I hope Deputies will realise in the years to come what has gone on and that we have a catastrophic situation on our hands. The responsibility for this cannot be ignored. The time is now. We have to address this. There is a choice before us, it is a responsibility we cannot keep avoiding: families or system. I am clear. The uncertainty does not belong in family homes. This belongs now to the State. It is the State that has a responsibility to carry this burden, not the families, the people who did nothing wrong or the children growing up underneath the shadow of the defective concrete. When the bell rings for the vote this evening, this House will decide something very simple: where the burden sits. That decision does not end with this vote; it begins there. I stand with the families, like all my colleagues in opposition today who have stood. I say to the homeowners that we are fighting for them night and day and we will not forget. I will not move the burden onto those who did not create it. I am asking this House to remember where the weight of this situation has occurred. The Government and the State have a responsibility.

Sentiment score: -0.08