I thank the Deputies for tabling these amendments. While I fully appreciate and understand the intent behind them, I am not in a position to accept them. This matter has been considered in detail at pre-legislative scrutiny, Second Stage and Committee Stage. I agree that scrutiny of NAMA's performance and of the value delivered to the taxpayer is both appropriate and important. However, I must again set out why this amendment is neither necessary nor feasible. First, NAMA's performance has been subject to extensive oversight throughout its lifetime. Its annual and quarterly accounts were laid before the Oireachtas and audited by the Comptroller and Auditor General. The Department of Finance conducted statutory five-year reviews and the Comptroller and Auditor General has also taken independent reviews including one published as recently as last month. Taken together, these provide a comprehensive and independent evidence base on NAMA's performance. Second, the available evidence indicates that NAMA has met and, in some respects, exceeded its objectives. It delivered a lifetime contribution of €5.6 billion to the State and eliminated a significant contingent liability through the early redemption of its senior debt. The Comptroller and Auditor General estimates a lifetime return of 6.8%, compared to the initial expectation of 5%. More broadly, NAMA is widely regarded internationally as a successful example of a state-backed asset management agency. Turning to the substance of the amendment, there are clear, practical and legal limitations. NAMA did not acquire property assets directly. It acquired and managed loans secured on property, with the assets remaining in the ownership of debtors or receivers. Once loans were resolved or the underlying asset disposed of, they exited the NAMA system. NAMA's mandate, as set by the Oireachtas, was to deal with its portfolio expeditiously. It was never intended to operate as a long-term asset holder nor would it have been appropriate to attend assets on a speculative basis in the hope of future price increases. The recent report by Professor John FitzGerald provides useful context. It notes that despite the Government facing external pressure to accelerate disposals, NAMA adhered to its strategy and, in doing so, was able to maximise value. The report concluded that this was the right approach. As market conditions improved, many borrowers refinanced or repaid their loans. In such cases, loans exited the NAMA system and the agency could not, and should not, have prevented this. This is a normal feature of a recovering financial system. It is also the case that in the post-crisis environment, debt levels in many instances exceeded underlying asset values. In that context, agreed disposal strategies were a necessary part of deleveraging and reflected the financial realities of the time. As a result, NAMA does not systematically retain or control information on subsequent resale values or updated valuations. Constructing such a database retrospectively would require extensive third-party data, much of which are not publicly available or are commercially sensitive. More fundamentally, even if such data were available, the proposal would be inherently counterfactual. It relies on assumptions about future market conditions, financing costs and risks that cannot be reliably reconstructed. It does not reflect the context in which NAMA operated - a distressed market, significant uncertainty and a statutory obligation to reduce risk and dispose of assets over time and not to speculate on future price movements. Subsequent valuations taken in isolation do not provide a reliable basis for assessing decisions taken at the time. In many cases, assets were further developed, restructured or invested in after disposal and any uplift in value reflects those subsequent actions. This is not unique to NAMA but a normal feature of property markets. Crucially, only the property owner holds the full information on post-sale investment, including capital and operating costs. This information is essential to any robust comparison but is not accessible, even to the Department of Finance. Without it, any analysis would be incomplete and potentially misleading. There are also strict, statutory confidentiality obligations limiting the disclosure of debtor-specific or commercially sensitive information. These obligations continue after NAMA's dissolution. It is important to consider the broader context. NAMA has delivered a strong return to the State, repaid its debt in full and substantially completed its mandate, and successfully managed a complex and high-risk portfolio by supporting financial stability. NAMA was established to manage impaired loans, not to hold assets indefinitely in anticipation of future gains. It operated within a statutory and state aid framework that required it manage and dispose of assets over time. A speculative holding strategy would have exposed the State to ongoing risk and delayed deleveraging and would have potentially hindered economic recovery. In that context, comparison with later market values does not provide a meaningful basis for assessing decisions taken at the time nor is it well-founded to assume that assets could simply have been held longer to generate higher returns. While the objective of transparency is fully accepted, the approach proposed in this amendment would neither be feasible nor produce meaningful results. NAMA's performance has already been subject to extensive audit reporting and independent review and for those reasons, I will not accept the amendment.
Sentiment score: 0.15
I will respond to the amendment that was put down, which is relates to the transfer of staff, not one individual staff member. I thank Deputy Doherty for bringing forward this amendment which proposes to amend the legislation to require us reporting on staff from NAMA to the NTMA, including salary information. As outlined on Committee Stage, the legislation does not include any provisions relating to the transfer of staff from NAMA to the NTMA. The general scheme of the Bill, published in 2024, had included a standard provision to provide for the transfer of staff, reflecting precedents in other similar legislation. However, following further engagement with NAMA and the NTMA, it became clear that no statutory mechanism is necessary in this case. This is because NAMA does not employ staff in its own right. All individuals working in NAMA have always have been employees of the NTMA assigned to perform NAMA functions. Accordingly, there is no transfer of employment arising from the dissolution of NAMA and therefore the premise of the transfer of staff does not arise in fact or in law. In practical terms, a small number of staff will be assigned to a dedicated unit within the NTMA to manage the limited residual work that will remain following NAMA's dissolution. This is not a new statutory structure but a functional unit operating within the NTMA's existing operational governance and resourcing framework. The roles within the unit are aligned with the completion of the residual work and the work itself is simply being integrated into the ongoing operations of the NTMA. When operational, the unit's eight staff are expected to comprise a head of unit, two finance professionals, two operational professionals, two better case managers and one legal professional. The head of the unit will report to the NTMA's chief financial and operating officer and the unit will be supported by the NTMA's wider operational platform including IT, compliance, human resources and facilities. No additional stand-alone corporate infrastructure is required. It is also important to recognise the broader organisational context. The NTMA is a large established State body with approximately 688 employees at the end of 2025, excluding those assigned to NAMA. While the dissolution of NAMA is a significant step reflecting the fact that it has largely concluded its operational work, the assignment of a small number of staff to a specific function within the NTMA is an internal organisational matter. While the Deputy does not specifically refer to the position of chief executive officer in his amendment, he does in his contribution. I again note that this role will cease on the dissolution of NAMA as the legislative basis for the position is repealed. The current CEO has been a permanent employee of the NTMA operating in a senior executive role before NAMA's establishment. He will transition within the organisation under his existing contractual framework. This does not involve a new appointment but reflects the normal reassignment of an NTMA employee following organisational change. As with all NTMA staff, matters relating to assignments, roles and individual contractual terms are managed within the agency. Neither the Tánaiste, as Minister for Finance, or I have any role in such arrangements. Turning to the remuneration, the NTMA operates within an established statutory and governance framework. It complies fully with the code of practise for the governance of State bodies and provides transparency through its annual report, including the publication of employee remuneration in bands of €25,000, beginning with those earning in excess of €50,000. This ensures appropriate public accountability at an aggregate level. It would not be appropriate to publish salary information relating to individual employees. Such information constitutes personal data and is subject to contractual confidentiality and data protection requirements. Staff assigned to the resolution unit will be captured within the existing NTMA reporting arrangements in the same manner as staff across all other functional areas of the NTMA. More broadly, the NTMA is an established State body with its own statutory functions, governance structures and accountability arrangements. Decisions related to staffing, organisational structure and the allocation of roles within the agency are matters for the NTMA itself operating within that framework. In that context, the additional reporting requirements proposed in this amendment are neither necessary nor proportionate. The amendment is predicated on a transfer of staff that does not arise as all NAMA staff are employed by the NTMA and there is no transfer of staff under the legislation. The information sought is also already either publicly available at an appropriate level of aggregation or relates to matters that are governed within NTMA's existing oversight and confidentiality framework. For these reasons, I am not in the position to accept the amendment.
Sentiment score: 0.06
I would like to come in.
Sentiment score: 0.36
I would make the point that the current CEO of NAMA had been a permanent employee of the NTMA since before NAMA's establishment. The NAMA CEO position will cease on the dissolution of NAMA. At that point, he will continue as an NTMA employee under his existing employment framework and individual contract. This does not involve a new appointment or, indeed, any special arrangement but reflects his ongoing status as an NTMA employee. He has not been newly appointed or accommodated. Rather, his role is changing following the dissolution of NAMA, and any future role he takes within the organisation is a matter for the current CEO of the NTMA and he will report within the NTMA structure. He will not be the Accounting Officer. He will not be the CEO of the NTMA. As with all staff, his contractual rights as an employee continue to apply. Matters relating to individual contacts are the responsibility of the CEO and the NTMA and are not determined by the Minister. Neither I, as Minister of State, or, indeed, the senior Minister have any role in individual contractual terms and conditions or assignments within the NTMA. The CEO of the NTMA is appointed through an open competitive process and is accountable to the Committee of Public Accounts and the staff underneath him are accountable to the CEO.
Sentiment score: 0.02
We will have to wait for the publication of the annual report.
Sentiment score: 0.00
In an aggregated-----
Sentiment score: 0.00
In an aggregated format.
Sentiment score: 0.00
I move amendment No. 4: In page 17, to delete lines 35 to 43, and in page 18, to delete lines 1 and 2 and substitute the following: “ ‘residual NAMA matter’ means any asset, liability, right, cause of action, entitlement or obligation of any nature or kind, or legal proceedings, that immediately before the dissolution day was an asset, liability, right, cause of action, entitlement or obligation of any nature or kind of, or relating to, NAMA or a NAMA group entity and, in the case of legal proceedings, were legal proceedings to which NAMA or a NAMA group entity was a party or which were otherwise relating to NAMA or a NAMA group entity, and which on and after the dissolution day is an asset, liability, right, cause of action, entitlement or obligation of, or relating to, the Agency or a subsidiary of the Agency, as the case may be, or, in the case of legal proceedings, are legal proceedings to which the Agency or a subsidiary of the Agency is a party or which are otherwise relating to the Agency or a subsidiary of the Agency, as the case may be;”. I flagged on Committee Stage that I intended to introduce a small number of amendments to Part 4 of the Bill on behalf of the Minister for Finance. These amendments are technical in nature and are designed to ensure clarity and consistency in the drafting of the legislation. As Deputies will be aware, the Bill provides for the orderly wind-down of NAMA and for the transfer of any residual matters to the NTMA for management to completion, including the continuation of any ongoing proceedings. The Bill also facilitates the conclusion of the IBRC special liquidation, with provision for any remaining residual matters to transfer to the NTMA for management to completion by way of transfer agreement entered into between the relevant parties. A key element of that process is ensuring the seamless continuation of any outstanding matters, including ongoing legal proceedings, with provision for the substitution of the NTMA in place of NAMA and the IBRC as appropriate in such proceedings, along with the continuation of associated rights and obligations. In that context, the amendments being brought relate to the terminology used in Part 4 and ensure clarity and consistency in how references to proceedings are expressed across the relevant positions. This is simply to ensure that the provisions operate clearly and consistently in practice. These amendments are purely technical in nature and do not alter the underlying policy intent of the Bill in any way. The policy remains unchanged, namely to ensure the effective transfer of residual functions, assets, liabilities and legal matters to the NTMA, and to allow those matters to be brought to an orderly conclusion. I therefore commend these amendments to the House.
Sentiment score: 0.46
I move amendment No. 5: In page 20, line 2, after “proceedings” to insert “of any nature or kind (including legal proceedings)”.
Sentiment score: 0.15
I move amendment No. 6: In page 27, line 36, after “to” where it firstly occurs to insert “legal”.
Sentiment score: -0.15
I move amendment No. 7: In page 28, line 12, after “any” to insert “legal”.
Sentiment score: -0.15
I move amendment No. 8: In page 28, lines 25 to 27, to delete all words from and including “in” in line 25 down to and including “matters” in line 27 and substitute “, in relation to any relevant residual matter”.
Sentiment score: -0.15