This is an important Bill that deals with the most serious of questions, namely, how we keep our citizens and citizens of neighbouring states safe and how we co-operate with our European neighbours to ensure the rights of our citizens are protected. The Minister has publicly stated that the Bill is an important step in demonstrating Ireland's commitment to implementing the EU's e-evidence package and improving access to digital evidence for serious crime investigations. It is about how we make sure that the digital world is one where laws are enforced, rights are safeguarded and the technology giants upon which so much of modern life depends play their part and are held accountable. I understand that the rush to legislate is not unusual for EU deadline-driven legislation. We faced similar time pressures in the past when implementing EU directives or regulations with fixed application dates. However, the seriously reduced opportunity to engage with this Bill in the House is both unfortunate and somewhat disrespectful to Members. Given the package was first endorsed in the EU in 2023, it really beggars belief that we could not have had far more dialogue on it before now. The Bill puts in place an entirely new office and staff to enforce its rules. The Department has made clear that this body will grow to a substantial size and carry a significant budget with it. Ireland, being home to many of the world's biggest technology and digital services firms, can expect to have a large workload arising from these EU rules. We can be leaders in that but it is absolutely vital that we get it right from the off. We must be sure that the procedures and bodies we put in place to carry out the work are properly resourced and are given not just enough powers but the right powers. This is a Bill that deserves close scrutiny in the Oireachtas. The questions at play are simply too important to risk getting it wrong. International co-operation on law enforcement is absolutely essential, particularly in the digital space. Digital evidence does not respect borders, and police forces and enforcement bodies simply cannot afford to operate in national silos when it comes to online evidence. The European Union is in a unique position globally to put the mechanisms in place to ensure its member states' national and local law enforcement bodies co-operate in this area. That idea was at the heart of the EU's e-evidence package and it is at the heart of this Bill. It is a sensible and welcome idea. However, we in the Labour Party have some questions about the legislation, which we will raise as it progresses through the Oireachtas. The first issue I raise concerns privileged material. It is an issue that been raised repeatedly in the House in recent times. Repeatedly, the Government has been slow to recognise the importance of protecting legal or journalistic privilege when bringing forward legislation. That has been particularly true in relation to legislation coming from the Department of justice. Subsections (3) and (4) of section 32 allow for the compelled disclosure of potentially privileged material subject to a subsequent High Court determination, with a 30-day window to apply. The key word here is "subsequent". The 30-day window runs from the date of disclosure or taking of possession but there is no explicit ban or any kind of interim restraint on the use of that privileged material while the court application is pending. It is essential to address this issue and, to that end, we have tabled amendments to make clear in the Bill that where an authorised officer or adjudication officer compels disclosure or takes possession of a record that may be subject to legal privilege, the officer cannot use, copy, communicate or act upon that record before the High Court's determination. Our amendments will be debated on Committee Stage tomorrow. I hope the Government will look closely at the issue and accept the amendments. This is common sense. Legal privilege must be protected throughout the process. The Government recognises that by including section 32 in the first place but we need to ensure that there are no potential loopholes. We cannot have a situation where legislation potentially allows for the free usage of material that might later be ruled privileged by the High Court. We also have serious questions about the resourcing of the new office of the director of criminal justice international co-operation and the potential costs associated with it. Those concerns were raised during pre-legislative scrutiny and I have yet to see a convincing answer to them from the Government. As the home to a very large number of digital service providers, Ireland can expect a larger number of requests relative to our size than other member states. How will the Government ensure that the new office can handle that large volume of work without doing so being to the detriment of the current workings of the Department of justice? We have heard that the expectation is that the office could grow in size to 150 staff. The estimate based on current numbers is that it will deal with 24,000 notifications each year. However, the actual number could be much higher. The Department has said that the number of notifications sent to the office will only be known once the regulation comes into effect. There is real potential for two different scenarios, neither of which is welcome. We could have an under-resourced office that cannot keep up with the amount of work landing on its desk, leading to long waiting times or even mistakes being made, or we may have an office that keeps expanding and taking an ever-growing share of the Department's expenditure and requiring ever-growing staff numbers. There is a real risk of a very large cost arising that balloons over time. I have no doubt that this work is important, even vital, but how will the Government ensure the potential costs and resourcing requirements are properly managed? We can look at the example of the National Cyber Security Centre, which is a key public body aimed at keeping digital space safe. It has been under resourced and overworked throughout its existence. We cannot afford to keep making the same mistakes, and the Government has done nothing to earn our confidence that this new office will not face similar challenges. Can the Minister give real assurances that this body will be properly resourced to undertake the substantial job of work that will come across its desk and that a proper assessment of the potential for future growth in a number of notifications that it deals with has been carried out? Finally, it is essential that Ireland does not risk double criminalisation and we do not end up facilitating the prosecution of individuals who have committed an act that would not constitute a criminal offence here in Ireland. This issue was also raised at pre-legislative scrutiny. For example, if an EU member state were to criminalise the provision of online information about abortion services, would there be a risk that Ireland would be required to collaborate in evidence-sharing about a potential breach of that law? I have seen the Department's response to the committee's pre-legislative scrutiny report, which seems to point to Article 12(1)(d) of the e-evidence regulation for reassurance on this point. However, it still seems to be the case that service providers based in Ireland, as distinct from the new office itself, could be compelled to co-operate on such a case. I would welcome more clarity on this from the Minister. Can he assure the House that this legislation will not undermine Irish law in any way? International co-operation on digital law enforcement is absolutely vital, particularly within the EU; no one on these benches will argue with that. However, there are significant elements of this Bill that need greater clarity from the Government, and we will continue to press those as this Bill moves forward.

Sentiment score: 0.25