I move amendment No. 1: In page 4, between lines 7 and 8, to insert the following: “ ‘crime against humanity’ means any of the acts specified in Article 7 of the Statute of the International Criminal Court; ‘genocide’ means any of the acts specified in Article 6 of the Statute of the International Criminal Court; ‘war crime’ means any of the acts specified in Article 8.2 of the Statute of the International Criminal Court.”. Amendment No. 1 inserts these definitions. Amendment No. 4, which is a substantive amendment, reads: Prohibition on procurement or use of certain technologies 43DA.(1) An Garda Síochána, the Minister, or any public body acting on their behalf shall not procure, license, contract for, deploy, or otherwise make operational use of any biometric analysis technology, surveillance technology, software, hardware, dataset, or related service supplied by— (a) a company incorporated, headquartered, or substantially operating in a state engaged in war crimes, crimes against humanity or genocide, (b) a subsidiary, affiliate, or parent undertaking of such a company, or (c) any entity that develops, trains, sources, or operates biometric or surveillance systems using data, infrastructure, or technology originating a state engaged in war crimes, crimes against humanity or genocide. (2) For the purposes of this section, ‘surveillance technology’ includes any system capable of biometric analysis, facial recognition, behavioural categorisation, pattern of life analysis, or the processing of biometric data within the meaning of the Data Protection Act 2018. (3) Any existing contract, memorandum of understanding, or procurement arrangement that contravenes subsection (1) shall not be renewed, extended, or varied, and shall be terminated at the earliest date ... (4) Nothing in this section shall prevent the Minister from authorising the temporary retention of data or equipment solely for the purpose of evidential preservation ... (5) No biometric data collected, processed, or retained under this Act shall be transferred to, processed by, or stored on any server, cloud service, or technological infrastructure— (a) located in a state engaged in war crimes, crimes against humanity or genocide. (b) controlled by an entity referred to in subsection (1), or (c) operated using software, firmware, or backend systems originating in a state engaged in war crimes, crimes against humanity or genocide.” The reason for these amendments is that banning the use of technology from states engaged in war crimes and genocide should not even be up for debate. It should be an absolute given. We know that An Garda Síochána has used and is probably still using surveillance technology originating from the State of Israel. The record of Israel is highly problematic from both a national security perspective and because it is supporting a genocidal regime that uses this very technology to target Palestinians. In 2023, for example, An Garda Síochána paid €278,000 to Cognyte, an Israeli surveillance technology company. Its main product is an investigative analytics platform that uses AI, facial recognition and data aggregation to analyse communications, CCTV, social media and much more. The company has a really controversial history. Its tools have been used in Indonesia to monitor LGBT and religious minorities. They have been used in Myanmar and South Sudan for mass interception. A Brazilian investigation alleges that the Cognyte system was used under the Bolsonaro regime to track political opponents. The Minister, Deputy O'Callaghan, cannot guarantee at present that this company's tools would not be used for the provisions under the recording devices Bill that we are discussing. We also know that the Garda has paid hundreds of thousands of euro to an Israeli cyberdefence company that has worked with Israeli authorities to target Palestinians during the current genocide in Palestine. That company, Cellebrite, has deep links to the Israeli military and intelligence and has previously been criticised by many international groups for selling its technology to repressive governments. This company has been used by Israel to target Palestinians throughout the current genocide in Gaza. In 2021 alone, the Garda spent over €200,000 on that company's services. While it is important that gardaí have access to technology, including the deception technology required to detect and prosecute serious crimes, alternatives have to be found to using companies from states that are engaged in war crimes, genocide or crimes against humanity. Without enshrining this in law, I do not believe that will happen. The experience to date says it will not happen. In 2024, the Government banned future purchases of military equipment from Israel due to the actions of the Israeli Government in Gaza, but this ban did not apply to An Garda Síochána. The acceptance of these amendments would mirror and be wholly consistent with the position that the Government has taken with respect to the purchase of military equipment by the Defence Forces. It would also be important - I want to stress this - that from a national security perspective, it would make absolutely no sense to procure this type of technology from a state that has been quite blatantly hostile to Ireland simply because this State has stood up against the crime of genocide that is occurring in Gaza. I encourage and implore the Minister to accept amendments Nos. 1 and 4 so that we can enshrine their provisions in this legislation and ensure that we provide new powers to the Garda to procure equipment that will have very extensive capabilities while at the same time not assisting what is now by definition a rogue state.
Sentiment score: -0.12
The difficulty is that we know An Garda Síochána has purchased this type of equipment from companies that have close relationships with the Israeli regime. The current legal position is that this can continue. The Minister mentioned that we did not need to put this in primary legislation, but since Committee Stage up to now, I do not understand why the Minister did not cut this off at the pass by introducing these types of provision by regulation, as has been the case in respect of the Defence Forces. The Minister should answer to the House as to why he has not done that. In the absence of such a move, the only inference that can be taken is that there must be at least the interest in keeping the option of the Garda using companies that are engaged and collaborating in a genocide for the purpose of purchasing material that will ultimately be used to carry out biometric recognition in respect of Irish citizens. That is deeply concerning. For that reason, this House should put on the record where it stands on this issue. This will come back to bite the Government if it does not accept this amendment or bring forward the regulations that would provide the comfort. This is not just in respect of Israel. It is in respect of Russia and any other state that is engaged in activities that are declared by the International Criminal Court, ICC, to be either genocide or war crimes.
Sentiment score: 0.08
We are dealing with a Bill that would, for the first time, allow what we all hope would be the appropriate use of biometric recognition technology in order to assist our police force in tackling serious crime, security matters and missing persons cases. Most people in the House recognise that, for those serious issues, there is a need for the use of that type of technology. However, there is also a consensus that we have to ensure appropriate safeguards because we have seen how this type of technology has been abused internationally. A number of states have used this type of technology for aggressive reasons. They have used it to either spy on their own citizenry on an ongoing basis or pursue war crimes and breaches of international law. To be clear, with this amendment, we are just putting in one of the necessary safeguards to ensure that we do not allow technology to be supplied by companies that collaborate with states engaged in war crimes or genocide. As I said at the outset, that should not even be up for debate. I thought the Minister would have welcomed and adopted that. My real concern is that while the Minister has said, as he did on Committee Stage, that this is something he will give consideration to by way of regulation, he has not assured this House that he will be pursuing that route. It is for those reasons that I will be pressing the amendment.
Sentiment score: 0.01
I move amendment No. 2: In page 6, after line 40, to insert the following: “(3A) A member of An Garda Síochána shall not deploy biometric analysis unless authorised in advance by a member of An Garda Síochána not below the rank of Chief Superintendent, who shall record in writing the grounds of necessity and proportionality for such deployment.”. This amendment was discussed on Committee Stage. It seeks to ensure that there are safeguards in terms of how this technology can be used and, crucially, to ensure that there is no overreach, by ensuring that the deployment of biometric analysis or facial recognition must be authorised in advance by a garda not below the rank of chief superintendent. As I said during the previous discussions on this Bill, we know that gardaí have faced disciplinary processes for misuse of the PULSE system in the past, for example. There was one particularly horrendous case in which a former garda was ultimately jailed for inciting strangers to rape a colleague. That type of situation is in the minority. It is something that does not happen and we would not expect to happen. The individual pleaded guilty to the unauthorised disclosure of Garda PULSE personal data on 14 different individuals. While it is important to say, as I mentioned, that such misuses would only ever relate to a very tiny minority, it does point to a misuse of the PULSE system and, in my view, reinforces the need to ensure we have proper protections in place to ensure that when we are adopting new technologies that they are only used when appropriate, that they are properly authorised and that they are absolutely necessary for the investigation of serious crimes or missing persons or matters of that nature. It is appropriate that we would set an appropriate level of Garda rank who could authorise that and in my view the authorisation should come from a chief superintendent or above.
Sentiment score: -0.03
I am not entirely reassured by the Minister's assurances. He talks about a code of practice which this House will have no hand, act or part in developing. His own Department and his office, in particular, since he has taken office have been incredibly reluctant to provide information to the Members of this House on how decisions are made or how matters relating to the outworkings of legislation actually work in practice. I would have thought this would be a fairly standard safeguard to ensure the public could be assured that, before this type of technology is utilised, it is actually approved by a senior garda. The question then is at which rank that should be. We have indicated in this amendment that it should be chief superintendent. I think that is eminently reasonable. To talk about a code of practice that may or may not have adequate or even stronger safeguards ultimately does not provide the assurances this House should have before we pass legislation that will, ultimately, convey substantial new powers to An Garda Síochána.
Sentiment score: 0.16
I will make a couple of comments in conclusion. The Minister knows full well that nobody is suggesting that there would be individual authorisation for every single image, for every still and video. The amendment does not suggest that at all. It states that it would be authorised in advance by a chief superintendent or higher and that there would be a written record of the grounds for necessity and proportionality. That would negate the suggestion that this would become just a rubber-stamping exercise. The amendment is eminently sensible in my view.
Sentiment score: 0.05
I move amendment No. 3: In page 8, between lines 12 and 13, to insert the following: “Processing and storage of data 43DA.Biometric data processed under this Act shall— (a) be retained only for the minimum period strictly necessary, (b) be stored and processed exclusively on servers located within the European Union, (c) not be accessible to private contractors, and (d) be deleted immediately once no longer required for the purpose for which it was collected.”. This amendment is about ensuring that there can be full public confidence. I think there is broad recognition that this type of technology will become an important and useful mechanism to An Garda in its work of tackling serious crime, dealing with security matters and particularly, hopefully, in respect of missing person cases. I will state again, however, that the public will want to be assured that there are safeguards in terms of how and when this technology will be used. This amendment seeks to ensure that we have full protection in terms of where the data is processed and stored and to ensure that such data is only stored for the necessary period. As we permit the use of this kind of technology in assisting gardaí to do their job of detecting crime and catching criminals, we also need to ensure there are safeguards in terms of what is being processed and for how long it is being held. That is what this amendment simply does. I believe it is important because without this type of amendment there is going to be some public concern about the deployment of this type of technology. This amendment is a way of negating that in a way that does not disrupt the intention of the Bill.
Sentiment score: 0.18
I move amendment No. 4: In page 8, between lines 12 and 13, to insert the following: "Prohibition on procurement or use of certain technologies 43DA.(1) An Garda Síochána, the Minister, or any public body acting on their behalf shall not procure, license, contract for, deploy, or otherwise make operational use of any biometric analysis technology, surveillance technology, software, hardware, dataset, or related service supplied by— (a) a company incorporated, headquartered, or substantially operating in a state engaged in war crimes, crimes against humanity or genocide, (b) a subsidiary, affiliate, or parent undertaking of such a company, or (c) any entity that develops, trains, sources, or operates biometric or surveillance systems using data, infrastructure, or technology originating a state engaged in war crimes, crimes against humanity or genocide. (2) For the purposes of this section, 'surveillance technology' includes any system capable of biometric analysis, facial recognition, behavioural categorisation, pattern of life analysis, or the processing of biometric data within the meaning of the Data Protection Act 2018. (3) Any existing contract, memorandum of understanding, or procurement arrangement that contravenes subsection (1) shall not be renewed, extended, or varied, and shall be terminated at the earliest date permissible under contract law. (4) Nothing in this section shall prevent the Minister from authorising the temporary retention of data or equipment solely for the purpose of evidential preservation, forensic examination, or legal compliance, provided that no further operational use is made of such technology. (5) No biometric data collected, processed, or retained under this Act shall be transferred to, processed by, or stored on any server, cloud service, or technological infrastructure— (a) located in a state engaged in war crimes, crimes against humanity or genocide. (b) controlled by an entity referred to in subsection (1), or (c) operated using software, firmware, or backend systems originating in a state engaged in war crimes, crimes against humanity or genocide.".
Sentiment score: -0.13
I move amendment No. 6: In page 9, between lines 36 and 37, to insert the following: “10.The Minister shall ensure that no national deployment of biometric categorisation technologies shall occur until a pilot programme has been completed and independently evaluated, including assessments of— (a) accuracy and error rates, (b) discriminatory impacts, (c) compliance with data protection law, and (d) impacts on privacy and fundamental rights, and the evaluation shall be laid before both Houses of the Oireachtas.”. The amendment follows on from the roll-out of other technology used by gardaí, including body cameras. It would be eminently sensible that, prior to the full deployment of new technology, we would have a pilot programme. Such a programme would ensure that we end up with technology that is accurate and effective and that any issues which need to be identified are identified at an early stage and can be addressed prior to the wider roll-out.
Sentiment score: 0.02
I move amendment No. 7: In page 10, between lines 16 and 17, to insert the following: “(ba) clear and specific limits on the circumstances in which biometric analysis or biometric categorisation may be used, including prohibitions on use for general surveillance, population level monitoring, or speculative searches, (bb) objective thresholds and evidential standards that must be met before any biometric analysis may be initiated, (bc) safeguards to prevent disproportionate or discriminatory impacts, including mandatory risk assessment procedures, (bd) technical and operational parameters governing accuracy, reliability, and error rate thresholds, and (be) mandatory documentation, authorisation procedures and audit trails to ensure accountability and prevent misuse,”. Amendment No. 8 proposes to insert the following into the Bill: In page 11, between lines 22 and 23, to insert the following: “(5A) When making an order under subsection (5), the Minister shall lay the code of practice, together with an explanatory memorandum outlining the safeguards, limitations and parameters governing the use of biometric analysis and biometric categorisation, before each House of the Oireachtas.”. With respect to amendment No. 7, in response to a previous amendment, we heard the Minister cite the code of practice. Much is left to the code of practice regarding the potential concerns that people have, but there is no real clarification as to what the parameters of the code of practice will be. Therefore, it is important that we have some detail on the safeguards, data limits, oversight and practical uses within the overarching legislation. The section on the code of practice gives far too much discretion to the Garda Commissioner, who drafts, amends and controls the consultation process relating to the codes that regulate Garda powers. Safeguards are not fixed in the legislation, which leaves crucial questions unanswered. The additions in amendment No. 7 would strengthen the requirements in relation to the code of practice by requiring strict limits, objective evidential thresholds, anti-discrimination safeguards, technical accuracy safeguards and full authorisation, thereby ensuring that biometric powers would remain properly controlled and that there would be transparency and accountability. Amendment No. 8 is complementary to Committee Stage amendment No. 16. It proposes a requirement that the code of practice be laid before the Dáil and deals with the safeguards to which I referred earlier. With regard to the first review of the code of practice, amendment No. 9 suggests a change from five years to two. After the initial review, five years is fine. However, five years is too long to wait for the first review of the code of practice. The amendment is clear and sensible. It does not upset the apple cart. There will be five-year reviews, but the first review should take place after two years. When talking about a new technology, there are, as already discussed, many potential issues that may arise. Unless amendment No. 7 is adopted, the answer to the question as to where the code will end up is very cloudy. It is critical that this House stipulates in legislation that after the first two years, there will be a comprehensive review. The reviews will take place on a five-year basis thereafter, as the legislation currently stipulates.
Sentiment score: 0.05
I will make a quick point in respect of amendment No. 9. The review will take place after the roll-out. Any delays in the initial roll-out will not affect the review - and that is not suggested or implied in any way - from the enactment of this legislation to the roll-out. The Bill currently states that following the initial roll-out, the review will take place after five years. There is nothing in the Bill to prevent a review taking place earlier. What is critically important for public confidence, however, is that people know that once this legislation is in place, there will be a swift opportunity to analyse its effectiveness. I strongly believe that this would be more appropriately done after two years rather than five.
Sentiment score: 0.17
I move amendment No. 8: In page 11, between lines 22 and 23, to insert the following: “(5A) When making an order under subsection (5), the Minister shall lay the code of practice, together with an explanatory memorandum outlining the safeguards, limitations and parameters governing the use of biometric analysis and biometric categorisation, before each House of the Oireachtas.”.
Sentiment score: 0.02
I move amendment No. 9: In page 11, line 31, to delete “5 years” and substitute “2 years”.
Sentiment score: -0.15