85. Deputy Donnchadh Ó Laoghaire asked the Minister for Defence the capacity of the Defence Forces and security forces generally to respond to drone incursions in Irish aerospace and to respond to reported suspicious drone activity near Dublin Airport during the visit of President Zelenskyy. [72050/25]

86. Deputy Duncan Smith asked the Minister for Defence to provide an update on the drone activity during the visit of President Zelenskyy; to give clarity on the decision to not intercept these drones; and if she will make a statement on the matter. [72153/25]

89. Deputy Tom Brabazon asked the Minister for Defence her views on the reported drone sightings in north Dublin during President Volodymyr Zelenskyy's visit to Ireland; and the measures in place to detect, deter and disable unauthorised drone activity during high profile visits from international dignitaries; and if she will make a statement on the matter. [72320/25]

The presence of drones in Dublin Bay during the visit of President Volodymyr Zelenskyy was the source of much commentary internationally and domestically. We are facing into a crucial year in which security, and the ability of this State to ensure the safety and security of high-level meetings and the people attending them, will be under a good deal of scrutiny, which needs to come through. We need to consider the protocol with regard to the response to this and in terms of equipment. It is not something we wish to see repeated.

I propose to take Questions Nos. 85, 86 and 85 together. I thank the Deputies for their questions. As this is my first parliamentary question session as Minister for Defence, I look forward to working with them constructively at what we know is an important time in the world, particularly for Ireland's position on a range of defence matters. As Minister, I am committed to the ongoing transformation and modernisation of Óglaigh na hÉireann across land, air, sea and cyber domains. It is essential that we continuously strengthen our defence capabilities in light of what is a changed geopolitical landscape since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, in particular. As the Deputy said, a widely reported incident occurred on Monday, 1 December, regarding drones operating in the vicinity of a Naval Service vessel in the Irish Sea. Notwithstanding some suggestions, I will be clear that at no stage was the flight of President Zelenskyy compromised and the security operation, led by An Garda Síochána supported by the Defence Forces, was successfully deployed through multiple means, ultimately leading to a safe and successful visit to Ireland by President Zelenskyy, the first lady and their team. All of the circumstances, as you would expect after something like this, regarding the drone incident have been and are being investigated and analysed by the Defence Forces and An Garda Síochána. At all times, the Irish Naval Service vessel operated within standard operating procedures, rules of engagement and the law of the sea and could have exercised the right to self-defence if it considered itself under threat. This is obviously a decision that has to be taken by those who are trained and who are dealing with the potential response. In the circumstances, the Deputies will appreciate that it is not appropriate for me to comment further on operational decisions, particularly in relation to deployment of military capabilities. As Minister, I will prioritise the delivery of counter unmanned aerial systems capabilities for use by the Defence Forces - in other words, counter drone technology, which is an urgent operational priority. I can confirm that procurement of same is well advanced. Today at Cabinet, I brought forward a memo bringing forward such capabilities. We have approved the preliminary business case. I have said clearly that we will now be partnering with France, although a number of other countries have engaged with us on this. The next stage is to engage in extensive and further detail with France. I will bring forward a further business case in the new year. On top of that, we will bring forward early next year the counter radar system, which will be up and running and in place before the EU Presidency next year. One of my key priorities as Minister for Defence is to ensure that the operational capacity of the Defence Forces is maintained and developed in line with the Government’s decision to move to level 2 ambition as defined by the Commission on the Defence Forces. The Commission on the Defence Forces recommended the development of a primary radar capability to ensure that Ireland can maintain a complete recognised air picture. As I said, I brought this to Government this morning. A project team comprising senior civil and military personnel is continuing to progress the radar programme. This programme of work is ongoing and good progress has been made. When fully delivered, the recognised air picture will incorporate this suite of military radar systems. It will have the capability to detect all aircraft traversing our airspace, including any that may be operating with their transponders turned off. Full delivery of the programme will be complex. The timeline at the moment is out to 2028 but I have brought forward the counter drone elements of it, which will be procured and in place next year before the EU Presidency. As announced today the programme is moving to the next stages. We look forward to working with the Government and with France to make sure we have that in place as soon as possible. I assure Deputies that the Defence Forces are working closely with An Garda Síochána in response to these potential incidents we are seeing happening quite frequently across the EU. In the past couple of weeks I have regularly sat with colleagues across the European Council. We hear from colleagues in Lithuania that they are having significant hybrid threats with balloons in airspace. We have seen in Poland where explosions have literally taken trains off tracks. If it were not for some not exploding, there could have been significant loss of life. We are seeing other countries like Denmark and elsewhere where these types of threats are occurring more regularly. We have to be live to the fact that we are not immune to this. That is exactly why we are investing in the radar system, in particular. It is exactly why a significant proportion of the €1.7 billion of our capital plan announced last week will be invested in our radar system. That is why we are bringing forward the counter drone technology to be in place before the EU Presidency next year. That is why we are doing everything to make sure that where we can put in place new measures that they are done as soon as possible.

To be clear, there is no doubt but that the presence of drones such as this in our airspace is a threat to our national security. The neglect of the Defence Forces by the past three Governments, Fine Gael and Fianna Fáil in their various turns, has created a threat to our national security. The Minister spoke about bringing forward the radar picture, the anti-drone system and counter unmanned air system capabilities. That was due to be delivered in the autumn - quarter 3 of 2025. It is in the Commission on the Defence Forces. She is not bringing it forward. It is already late. In that context, it is a concern to me as to whether it will be in place before the EU Presidency. Realistically, it needs to be in place now. It is a huge concern that in the past there has been excellent co-operation between An Garda and the Defence Forces but to see both organisations briefing against each other raises significant concerns about the strength of the protocols that exist. We are not going to get into operational matters, because it would not be appropriate, but we clearly need to see protocols tighten up if there is a conflict in approach.

A lot of this has been well aired over the past couple of weeks but I have a number of questions. Will the Minister clarify if this is being treated as an act of hybrid warfare? Was air traffic control in Dublin Airport made aware in real time, or as close to real time, of the incident, and if not, why not? When was it made aware and what protocols underpin engagement with air traffic control in Dublin? Are there plans to release some form of footage relating to this to counter false narratives out there up to and including people doubting whether this actually happened? I, for one, believe it happened and believe this is a threat. However, I have concerns that without footage being released in some fashion that those false narratives could take hold and undermine us moving towards a more credible security strategy.

Reports of unauthorised drone sightings in north Dublin during the Zelenskyy visit are a matter of deep concern given the obvious security sensitivities involved. Such incidences highlight the real and present risk posed by drones during the high-profile visit. We can expect activity like this to persist when Ireland takes over the EU Presidency next year, as our counterparts in Denmark experienced during their Presidency. I raised this matter with the Taoiseach last week during Taoiseach's questions. In his response he advised that Ireland is developing radar capacity and that we are procuring equipment, that the Garda special detective unit is carrying out an investigation of the circumstances of the incident, and that we have already enhanced our anti-drone capabilities. Will the Minister advise what stage the procurement process is at, and when will the radar be delivered? Is there a date for that and when it will become operational? Will she also provide any updates on the Garda investigation into the sightings, and advise what threat assessments are carried out and will be carried out during the visits of international dignitaries?

I am responding to different questions. First, we all know there were drones. For anybody suggesting otherwise, we know that was the case. I repeat that at no stage did they compromise the security operation that was in place for President Zelenskyy's visit. I will say that we are taking this matter extremely seriously. That is why there is a review under way. That is why the Garda is conducting a review working with the Defence Forces. Of course, if lessons need to be learned about how different information was communicated and whether or not appropriate steps were taken. My understanding is that all appropriate steps were taken and all proper controls were followed. However, we need to make sure we can learn from any type of scenario like this because we are all aware that these types of incidents are not once-off. We are seeing them happen more regularly and that is why we are taking them seriously. It is also important to stress that this was a successful visit. We did not close down airspace. There was not any issue in terms of the plane or visit itself. That in itself shows that we have the radar capacity to identify them but we know we need to enhance our capability. That is exactly why we are investing in the way we are now. We have capacity already but we know there are gaps and we need to enhance it. When António Costa visited Ireland last week, he was asked the question, "Do you have confidence in Ireland's capacity and capabilities?" and his very clear answer was "Yes". It is important for all of us to be confident in the capacity of our Defence Forces and An Garda Síochána to defend this country and to make sure we have a successful Presidency. I certainly have confidence but again, there is more we need to do. Regarding the relationship between An Garda Síochána and the Defence Forces, and I have spoken to the Chief of Staff of the Defence Forces many times, including as recently as this afternoon, the Chief of Staff is in constant engagement with Garda Commissioner, Justin Kelly. They are in constant engagement and that will continue, if not increase, in the run-up to the Presidency to make sure in our security operations, which will be led by An Garda Síochána, they are working closely together and that other agency, whether it is air navigation or anybody else on the ground, that need to be involved in part of the overall security operation is involved in that too. As regards our counter-drone technology, I hope to have a contract signed by the end of the year, which will mean we will have the technology bought before the first half of next year, that is, by May or June. In parallel with this, training will take place within the Defence Forces to make sure we have members that are able to use it. Of course, the Presidency will start in the beginning of July and I appreciate timelines may have changed but I am saying very clearly I will be signing a contract before the end of the year. We will have this capacity before the second half of next year and we will have it in place and operational before the Presidency starts. In terms of the overall Presidency, we will have the new security council, which has already met in this new government format and will be meeting soon. This is a structure that will be in place and will be meeting regularly throughout the Presidency. It is attended by members from An Garda Síochána, the Defence Forces and the relevant Ministers and Members. This is a space separate to the work ongoing between the gardaí and the Defence Forces to make sure the preparations, plans and security measures that need to be put in place are in place and are operational for next year.

There are many comments I would like to make but the first relates to the timeline. It sounds extremely tight. It will be purchased within the first half of the year but that is not a lot of time for the personnel to get used to this and ensure protocols are in place and so on. What struck me most was clearly the visit of President Zelenskyy was very welcome and worthwhile but the Minister has talked about it proving the radar system worked. These drones were 400 m or 500 m away from the naval vessels. They could be seen with the naked eye, so it does not prove anything on that or tell us anything about our radar capacity. I note the report last weekend by Conor Gallagher in The Irish Times made the point the LÉ William Butler Yeats did not have radar-guided weapons in the way the previous flagship, LÉ Eithne, had and it was therefore constrained in its ability. Finally, Deputy Smith is absolutely right. There is no reason it should not be released. I believe it, certainly, but transparency is important here and we need to get serious about that.

If the Minister does not have the answer now, I would like her to come back on the question relating to when air traffic control in Dublin Airport was informed about this. According to my sources, I understand it was not informed about this and has led to some disquiet about different organisations talking to each other. We have fixed rules regarding drone activity and no-fly zones and for the major airspace to not have been made aware of that is quite concerning. That is not to overstate this because it was a successful visit, but we are trying to hold Government to account and find gaps that need to be improved, not just for the EU Presidency but for our overall security architecture. Again, underpinning all of this is the lack of a national security strategy. I will repeat as often as I can that we need to see that published and we need to ensure we can agree a strategy that works for militarily neutral Ireland in the face of hybrid and other warfare threats.

I was happy with the response I received from the Minister but I agree with some of Deputy Smith's sentiments.

We all agree the world we are living in now is changing and the types of threats we are facing are changing. We are no longer just thinking about warfare in terms of land incursions and what we are seeing, whether it is in Ukraine or elsewhere in the world. Hybrid threats are happening on a daily basis that are impacting people's day-to-day lives and businesses. Perhaps, there are also more sinister threats across Europe and the world. We have to be clear we are not immune to these types of threats and that is why we are investing the way we are in our Defence Forces. The capital plan I announced last week provides for a 55% increase in spending on the previous capital plan. I will look to make sure we can do as much as we can with that and where and if possible, to increase that further. Our current spending on the Defence Force in the past four years alone has increased by about 40%. If we look at the work being done following on from the Commission on the Future of the Defence Forces and I am pleased that last year, for the first time in many years, investment in personnel did not go down but remained steady and is now starting to increase this year. We are finally starting to see an increase. There is an investment in the men and women of the Defence Forces and in our technology and equipment. A huge amount of work is also being done with the Defence Forces and An Garda Síochána to make sure we have the appropriate measures and responses in place. For security matters, the House will appreciate there are things that cannot and should not be said when it comes to our security and it is important our Defence Forces and An Garda Síochána can work effectively. There are certain things that cannot be said but they are working extremely well together. We are looking, as we always need to do, to see what the emerging threats are and whether there is more we need to do on how we need to increase our capabilities. That is exactly what we are doing with the new radar system and with our counter-drone technology. If there is more we need to do, that is certainly something I, as Minister for Defence, will make clear in my engagement with Government colleagues, as well as within the Defence Forces.

87. Deputy Donnchadh Ó Laoghaire asked the Minister for Defence further to recent Dáil debates, her views on past health and safety measures in the Air Corps; the actions she intends to take to support former aircraft maintenance and ancillary personnel; whether she intends to ensure their medical needs are met; and the other supports that can be offered to the category as a whole. [72051/25]

This is probably the Minister's first time debating this particular matter but the issue of the potential adverse health outcomes for former aircraft maintenance personnel in the Air Corps has been discussed a lot over the years. Many people who served in aircraft maintenance believe many have suffered very severe health outcomes, including untimely deaths, because of exposure to dangerous chemicals. What is the Minister going to do about that in respect of the category generally, not individual cases?

As this is my first time answering a question on this matter as Minister for Defence, I want to take this opportunity to say that the health and well-being of the men and women of Oglaigh na hÉireann is of the utmost importance. In fact, it is paramount and front and centre in everything we do, as it is to the Chief of Staff and Secretary General. I am very clear in my view as Minister that those who serve the State with such professionalism and integrity should be able to do so in a modern and well-equipped Defence Forces that is also a safe place to work, as all places should be. In that regard, as I mentioned previously, I announced a substantial investment of €1.7 billion in the Defence Forces over the next four years. It is not just about technology and equipment or new naval vessels. There is an investment specifically in the men and women and the equipment they use on a day-to-day basis. It is very important we invest in them directly and ensure they are working in safe spaces. I acknowledge the Deputy’s ongoing commitment to this issue. I am aware that, further to an offer made to him in this House by my predecessor, the Tánaiste, he availed of an opportunity to meet with some of my senior departmental officials in the past two weeks to share his views on this matter. The meeting, which took place at the end of November, I understand was constructive and I will continue to engage with the Deputy on this matter. It is absolutely essential the health, safety and well-being of the men and women of Oglaigh na hÉireann are front and centre in everything we do. I received an initial brief from my officials on the matter of health and safety in the Air Corps. I expect to have a detailed report from them in quarter 1 of 2026 regarding the matters the Deputy has brought before the House. This report will take due cognisance of the recent meeting he had with officials, as well as the views of the State Claims Agency, as it manages such litigation claims on my behalf. I also intend to seek the views of other stakeholders on what, if any, options may be open to me to pursue, further to my receipt of the report. All that being said, and the Deputy is very much aware of this fact, I am limited in what I can say further in this regard in this House. I am the defendant in several litigation cases that are under way and being dealt with in the courts. I say that obviously not to avoid discussing it, but there is litigation and it is important I do not impede or infringe on that at all. The Deputy will appreciate that it is an extremely complex matter. It requires very serious thought, engagement and deliberation. This is what my officials have been doing and it is something I will focus on and prioritise as well.

The reality is that this is not an issue that has only arisen in Ireland. We know that in other jurisdictions such as Australia and the Netherlands exposure to very powerful, strong and dangerous chemicals caused adverse health outcomes for personnel in those locations. Australia took a sensible approach. Officials evaluated the situation trhough the study of health outcomes for aircraft maintenance personnel and they offered health supports. That is key to what we do on this. That is the kind of approach that makes sense - evaluate the situation, try to identify the connections between the exposure and health impacts, provide healthcare solutions and find out how it came to pass. This has been examined on a number of occasions in the past, although not all of this is in the public domain. We had the EEA air monitoring report in 1995, Forbairt report in 1997 and HSA report in 2015, but there is other documentation that not public at this point in time. Is the Minister open to doing something in addition to dealing with individual cases as a category?

I appreciate that we might not be on our own and similar issues have arisen in other jurisdictions. It is about going through the appropriate process and making sure that we are responding in the most appropriate way. These matters are currently the subject of active and ongoing litigation, as I have mentioned. The HSA has conducted several inspections in Baldonnel Aerodrome and there is more detail in that regard than has been provided previously. What I want to do now is make sure that I receive the report being conducted in quarter 1. That is the timeline I have been given. I will then be able to make any decision on what future actions can be taken and whether something can be done separate to the individual cases and ongoing litigation at the moment. Ultimately, I want to support the men and women of Óglaigh na hÉireann. We want to make sure that we understand exactly what may or may not have happened here. Once I have that information then we can all decide what are the next appropriate steps and where we will take it from here. I have been given that timeline and I will work closely with my officials to make sure that we achieve it.

The Minister is right that the men and women of the Defence Forces are its greatest asset. The weight of this needs to be emphasised. The Air Corps Chemical Abuse Survivors, ACCAS, group has identified what it believes to be 110 untimely deaths. It has used that language advisedly because the link needs to be proven in that regard. However the group has questions and concerns over that many deaths and serious illnesses. That is the concern, and indeed in other jurisdictions there was a connection between the chemical exposure and serious illness. In the Air Corps there were many instances of no protective equipment, no masks and so on being provided. I appreciate court cases have to happen, and people have an entitlement to that. For the industrial schools and the Magdalen laundries this did not stop an approach that offered redress, support and accountability to the category as a whole concurrently. I encourage the Minister to talk to the Departments in question - indeed she was in one of those Departments herself - about how that was approached. We can have the court cases, which people are entitled to tae, and we can have a redress system for the category as a whole.

I will treat this with the utmost seriousness. I am working closely with my officials. It is also important to stress these are cases of alleged past exposure to toxic chemicals. I want to be clear that we are talking about issues that may have happened in the past and to reassure people in that regard. In terms of the HSA and the inspection that took place, it advised in a subsequent report in 2024 that the Defence Forces had proactively rolled out training in the use of substances across the relevant personnel and noted the evidence of compliance with the contravention notice, It is important to point out where there have been inspections, where there have been engagements with the Defence Forces and where there have been changes. As well as the report I mentioned, the tribunal of inquiry is due to start. This will have the power to investigate the response to complaints made regarding the use of hazardous chemicals within the Air Corps headquarters at the Casement Aerodrome. That is part of that as well, so there will be an opportunity within the tribunal to be able to consider adequately any of the complaint processes that have been made in light of the responses received. A number of different things are happening at the moment separate from the litigation and separate from the individual cases, with the review and the report that is being done. Obviously, there is another opportunity here throughout the inquiry for these types of concerns to be raised as well.

88. Deputy Donnchadh Ó Laoghaire asked the Minister for Defence for an update on the capacity in the Naval Service, in terms of personnel, specialist personnel and fleet; and if she will make a statement on the matter. [72052/25]

We have had a fair bit of discussion in recent weeks in on capital investment, but there is obviously the need for current investment. Our Naval Service has serious challenges because of a lack of specialist staff. Some of that is because of their attractiveness to employers in the private sector. The State invest in training people but then they are lost and not retained. That is holding back the full development of the Naval Service and it is something we need to come to terms with.

I understand from the military authorities that the strength of the Naval Service, as of 31 October 2025, the latest date for which this information is available, stood at 784 personnel out of an establishment of 1,094. While I appreciate that it is not at the establishment figure, this compares favourably to a total strength of 719 at the end of last year. The figures did not decrease last year and they started, thankfully, to increase this year. Challenges in the recruitment and retention of personnel in the Naval Service are well documented and to address these a wide range of recruitment and retention initiatives have been introduced. These include: an increase in the maximum recruitment age to 39 for those roles that had a recruitment age below that, and to 50 for direct entry officer specialists and we have seen, thankfully, that have a positive impact; an increase in the mandatory retirement age to 62; a doubling of the Naval Service patrol duty allowance after ten days; the extension of the Naval Service tax credit for a further five years; the application of the working time directive across the Defence Forces in January of this year, subject to certain exemptions; and the extension of the provision of private secondary healthcare to all members of the Permanent Defence Forces. There has also been significant progress on pay, with the most recent increase paid in August of this year with a further pay award due for all personnel in February of next year. Recruitment to the Naval Service is ongoing via a wide range of pathways, including general service recruitment, re-entry schemes and eight Naval Service-specific direct entry competitions. Figures provided by the Defence Forces for the year to date are encouraging. A total of 156 inductions to the Naval Service has been achieved as of 31 October. This represents an increase of 59 more than the total of 97 inductions achieved for all of 2024. In addition, applications for the Naval Service have grown substantially this year with the total number of applications received as of 31 October being 2,591, which is 31% higher than the total received for all of last year. Application numbers for direct entry specialist competitions are positive, and have resulted in growth in specialist recruitment. As of 31 October there have been 19 direct entry inductions into specialist roles in the Naval Service. This is the highest annual total recorded since the commencement of this specific direct entry recruitment for the Naval Service in 2019. I will come back later with further information.

The key question I raise here and my key concern about the Naval Service is to do with specialist personnel. The Naval Service such as it is today requires people with very high skills. Many of them gain these skills within the Naval Service, but we have had the embarrassing situation in the past 12 months that a navy ship was put to sea without a functioning main gun. The reason for that is the Naval Service did not have the specialist staff required, namely, artificers. There are also issues with marine engineering officers, because there is a significant outflow of them. We have seen a situation with the 63rd Naval cadet class where six cadets commenced training but only two were commissioned. There remaining four withdrew before being commissioned, referencing the extended service commitment associated with naval officer training as the primary reason for their departure. This is after considerable investment by the State and therefore, the loss of those personnel. Therefore, we need to be looking at commitment service schemes.

I appreciate that maybe the numbers look small, but this year we had the highest number of direct entry recruitments for specialists in the Naval Service since 2019. While the numbers are smaller, obviously, we are moving in the right direction. There were four direct entries to the Naval Service for electrical engineers, one direct entrant for marine engineering and two direct entries as operational branch officers. We then have Naval Service direct entry for hull artificer and Naval Service direct entry for radio or radar technician. We are starting to see an increase in the number of specialist positions there, but, again, there is more work we need to do. I fully appreciate that. There is a new strategy being worked on looking at the Defence Forces overall. The Defence Forces and the Chief of Staff are working on a strategy that will set out how we will achieve our overall targets and objectives, not just for the Naval Service but also for the overall force. I will work closely with them in the new year to see if we need to do more. A lot has happened in response to challenges that may have been precluding us from increasing our numbers. If there is more that can be done and that we should be doing, I will focus on that. The investment, including the very clear investment in our Naval Service, will, I hope, encourage more people to join the Naval Service.

It is not merely about small numbers - although the numbers are small - it is also about the proportion and the fact that of the cadre six who went into the 63rd naval cadet class, only two were commissioned. Two thirds of that cadre, however small, left early. That is the issue. Specialist numbers within the Naval Service are critically low despite targeted recruitment. Some of that is due to the extensive time required to train personnel in key technical areas. Marine engineering officers are one group I have identified. These groups are currently operating at approximately half strength, resulting in increased workloads, added responsibilities and declining morale. Retaining such expertise - marine engineering officers, artificers and so on - is essential for the effective operation of the Naval Service. A service commitment scheme such as has been recommended by RACO for certain critical roles, such as marine engineering officers, artificers and so on, would represent a tangible step towards stabilising the force. The Minister needs to look at that as a key action.

There are quite a number of different competitions, recruitments and initiatives ongoing, including those specifically for women. They are not necessarily specific to the Naval Service, but it is important that we support and work with the Defence Forces in making sure they are reaching out, whether in our schools or in different industries or sectors, specifically to ensure that we have those specialist positions and that we are reaching out to the areas and the specialist teams where we could maybe identify new recruits. There are different competitions and initiatives happening. I refer, in particular, to the Naval Service-specific competitions at officer rank, including those for operations branch officers, marine engineering officers, electrical engineering officers, engine room artificers, hull artificers, electrical artificers, radar-radio technicians and chefs. A great deal of work has been done. I appreciate that we need to do more, but it is very welcome that the numbers are starting to increase. We need to make sure we continue to focus on increasing them and reaching over the target of 1,000 we have set ourselves.